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Abstract
In Europe and North America, migration and 
integration has become a busy subfield of political 
sociology. Of particular interest in this respect is 
the integration of Muslims and Islam, which has 
dominated the  debate in Europe. Broadly conceived 
«political opportunity structures» have received 
much atten tion in this context. But the role of liberal 
law in the integration of  Islam has been largely 
ignored, not by lawyers of  course, but by political 
sociologists who have thus delivered far too negative 
and truncated pictures of Muslims and Islam in 
Europe. This is the deficit we sought to redress in Legal 
Integration of  Islam; A Transatlantic Comparison 
(2013) (co-authored with John Torpey). Some of this 
study’s main ideas and findings are presented in the 
following.
1. Introductory remarks
Written by a group of constitutional lawyers, the first 
comprehensive study of «legal integration» of Islam in 
Europe concludes, surprising for many, that the «legal 
systems of the European Union countries have the nec-
essary instruments to deal with and solve most of these 
problems,» and that the issue was mostly not «inno-
vating but rather applying rules that already exist.»1 
This must appear strange to Swiss readers, in whose 
country the inclusive thrust of liberal law, to be 
unfolded in the following pages, is seriously undercut 
by the democratic referendum process. So it may be all 
the more apposite to learn how the legal integration of 
Islam has proceeded outside the Eidgenossenschaft, 
1  Felice Dassetto, Silvio Ferrari, and Brigitte Maréchal, Islam in the 
European Union (Brussels: European Parliament, 2007), 59.
where the demos is much more restricted by liberal 
constitutional norms. 
Especially where a «Jewish precedent» existed2 – as 
with respect to ritual slaughtering, food in public 
canteens, or recognition of religious holidays in work 
and educational settings – Islam integration was 
simply a question of extending already existing 
exemptions or arrangements from Jews to Muslims. 
Freedom and equality, liberalism’s two core princi-
ples, have been the benchmark of the institutional 
integration of  Islam (like that of any minority reli-
gion). This is consistent with the separation of reli-
gion and state in liberal societies, but it is still an 
astonishing achievement that is notably not recipro-
cated in Islamic majority societies (or anywhere else 
outside the West).
Felice Dassetto, Silvio Ferrari, and Brigitte Maréchal 
identify a common «European model of relation 
between states and religions»3 that consists of three 
elements: religious freedom, autonomy of religious 
communities, and cooperation between the state 
and religious communities. This is unorthodox rea-
soning, for two reasons. First, many see «Europe» 
combined as marked by particular proximity between 
the state and only one religion, Christianity (and its 
various branches and incarnations), making it espe-
cially difficult for minority religions to find their place 
at the table.4 Moreover, the emphasis on convergence 
on a «European model» deviates from the standard 
«national model» account of religion-state regimes, 
which distinguishes between separationist (or laicist) 
regimes of the American or French kind, the estab-
lished church regime of the Scandinavian or British 
kind, and – somewhat in the middle – the public rec-
ognition of plural religions in Germany, Austria, or 
Spain.5 The important message of Dassetto, Ferrari, 
2  Christian Joppke, «Successes and Failures of Muslim Integration 
in France and Germany,» in Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, Jennifer Hochschild 
and John Mollenkopf (eds.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2009), 123.
3  Dassetto, Ferrari and Maréchal, Islam in the European Union  
(above n. 1), 36.
4  For example, Martha Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
5  For an account that holds these distinctions key to the relative 
successes and failures of Islam’s integration, see Joel Fetzer and 
Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and 
Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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ciple and qua liberal state the state has to be agnos-
tic and even-handed on religion.
Corporatist integration is certainly a much slower 
and messier process than integration on the basis of 
religious liberties, which operates instantly and sym-
metrically and does not allow any exception. Das-
setto, Ferrari, and Maréchal judiciously submit that 
the «cooperation» between state and organized reli-
gion is always of a «selective and gradual nature,» 
and they even see it controlled by «the values on 
which the political system and social peace are based: 
dignity of the human being, democratic citizenship, 
freedom of conscience, equality, and so on.»9 Accord-
ingly, they argue, corporatist integration must be 
«undiscriminating,» certainly, but it cannot occur 
«indiscriminately.»10 If this is correct, there is a deli-
cate problem for Islam: Can it really subscribe to all 
of these «liberal» values, including «freedom of con-
science,» which demands the right to exit from one’s 
religion – a right that Islamic law [sharia] in all shades 
infamously does not recognize even today? While 
the degree of ideological compatibility required for 
«cooperating» with the state is contested (see 
below), there is an even more fundamental problem 
for Islam to be corporately included: It requires a 
church-like central organization that is foreign to 
Islam, which has no clergy formally empowered to 
speak for all Muslims. Corporatist inclusion is thus 
likely to remain incomplete, not because of an inher-
ent Christian bias of the European state, but because 
of historical inertia – the slate can never be clean.
Apart from their different speeds and levels of inclu-
siveness, a further difference between individual and 
corporatist integration is their respective mecha-
nisms and ways of operating. Individual-level integra-
tion is mostly legally driven, while corporate integra-
tion is primarily a political process. The central actors 
in the first path are courts, especially constitutional 
courts that watch over religious liberty rights. By con-
trast, central to the second path are national govern-
ments that often propel the organizational forma-
tion of Islam for the sake of public order and policy 
effectiveness. This does not mean that either political 
actors or courts are absent from the individual and 
corporate integration paths, respectively. On the 
contrary, the dynamics between politics and law fun-
damentally shapes the development of both paths, as 
political «integration» concerns have recently moved 
courts to hold religious liberty rights less absolute 
than they did before, and as courts have often forced 
9  Dassetto, Ferrari and Maréchal, Islam in the European Union  
(above n. 1), 36.
10  Ibid.
and Maréchal’s «European model» account, which 
we largely confirm in Legal Integration of Islam (2013), 
is that these national differences are secondary to the 
overall inclusive stance of liberal state institutions 
toward Islam.6
Furthermore, in Legal Integration of Islam (2013) we 
propose that for properly assessing the institutional 
accommodation of Islam, one must distinguish 
between an individual rights path and a corporate 
recognition path. Each path operates at a different 
speed and with a different logic. The distinction itself 
reflects the fact that religion includes both individ-
ual and collective practice, and that the recognition 
of religious freedoms may not be enough to satisfy 
religion’s collective dimension. But Europe differs 
here from the United States. In its constitutional 
«free exercise» clause, the United States guarantees 
maximum liberties, individual and collective, to all 
religions, while denying them qua corporate body 
(or «church») any «cooperation» with the state in 
its «no establishment» clause. The situation is differ-
ent in Europe, where the state and the Catholic 
Church have been fighting for supremacy over the 
centuries, and where the state only gradually 
absorbed certain functions that traditionally had 
been exercised by the church, from the very power 
to govern the commonwealth in the early Middle 
Ages to the 20th century hold-outs of providing edu-
cation and welfare, but also the supply of meaning 
and identity, which, in a way, was taken over by mod-
ern nationalism.7 In the process, compromises had 
to be struck between two equal powers that were 
often fighting for the same terrain. These compro-
mises are by definition asymmetric and sticky, and 
they do not automatically extend to newcomers. 
This history and the nature of corporatist compro-
mise marks all European religion-state regimes, 
including the «laic» French regime that has always 
been counterpointed by the state-focused «Gallican 
church» tradition.8 It is thus astonishing that «equal-
ity» is the benchmark of integrating Islam not just at 
individual level but at group or corporate level also. 
European states cannot but do so because, despite 
factual amalgams between state and (some) 
religion(s), state and religion are still separate in prin-
6  An excellent study that retains an emphasis on differently successful 
Muslim accommodation across European states is, Angelika Schlanger, 
The Accommodation of Muslim Minorities in Western European 
Societies (unpublished manuscript in author’s possession). Schlanger 
argues that pluri-confessional and federalist states have been better at 
integrating Islam than mono-confessional and centralized states.
7  See James Q. Whitman, «Separating Church and State: The Atlantic 
Divide,» Historical Reflections 34/3 (2008): 86–104.
8  See John Bowen, «A View from France on the Internal Complexity of 
National Models,» Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33/6 (2007): 
1003–1016.
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analysis is correct, one wonders about the second 
half: Is this a plea for re-education? 
Limits to religious liberty are most visible in the long-
standing attempts to restrict the Islamic headscarf, 
which recently reached new heights in laws prohibit-
ing extreme veiling (burqas) in France and Belgium. 
The headscarf or veiling struggles are an exception to 
the rule of quiet integration by law, and thus require 
further attention. In this ideological minefield, where 
the traditional symbol of female subordination in 
Islam to some is the badge of female emancipation to 
others, it is important to differentiate. In round one 
of the European headscarf struggles, the issue was 
sector-specific restrictions of the ordinary headscarf 
(covering hair and ears, but not the face), especially 
in schools and the workplace. Interestingly, the 
courts went to some length to protect headscarf-
wearing women in the workplace, even if it was in the 
cosmetics section of a department store, where 
«appearance» is not unrelated to work perfor-
mance.14 However, the real site of conflict in round 
one was public education, where religious attire on 
the part of public school teachers has often been 
perceived as conflicting with the state’s mandate to 
be «neutral» on religion. But France went further and 
legislated against the headscarf of pupils in 2004. This 
law, which overturned a Council of State-driven lib-
eral practice in place since 1989, entails a novel defi-
nition of state neutrality, even under a traditionally 
expansive French laicité, as obliging not only the 
«providers» of state services but also their «users,» in 
this case schoolchildren. However, rather than 
reflecting a «racist» animus against Muslims, as femi-
nist historian Joan Scott thinks,15  the 2004 law stands 
in a long tradition of the republican state holding 
religion at bay, first Catholicism and now Islam, the 
latter seemingly set to invade the one remaining bas-
tion of French nation-building – public education.16
Round two in the European headscarf struggles is 
about the veil proper, which the French and Belgian 
«burqa» laws seek to suppress in public space at 
large.17 This entails a polarization and radicalization 
on both sides: First, because it concerns only the fun-
damentalist Salafi sect that quite visibly shows no 
inclination to «integrate» into liberal societies; but, 
secondly, because it constitutes the perhaps most 
14  Dagmar Schiek, «Just a piece of cloth?» The Industrial Law Journal 
33/1 (2004): 68–73.
15  Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).
16  See Christian Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 
chapter 2.
17  All quotes and references in the following two paragraphs are taken 
from Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam: A Transatlantic 
Comparison (above n. 11), chapter 2.
governments to do more on the corporate «coopera-
tion» front than they were initially prepared to do.
While thinking in terms of «convergence» on reli-
gious liberty and cooperation is more fruitful than 
traditional «church-state regime» reasoning, there is 
still one distinction that fundamentally divides Euro-
pean states in their approaches to the integration of 
Islam. From a liberal point of view, states have the 
possibility of either distancing themselves from reli-
gion or recognizing religion – the only condition 
being that such distancing or recognition occurs 
equally toward all religions, old and new, majority 
and minority. As clichéd as it is, France and Germany 
still stand for these opposite choices, in terms of 
French laicité (secularism) versus German offene Neu-
tralität (open neutrality). These choices bear specific 
liabilities or difficulties for Islam. The distancing from 
religion generates risks for religious liberties, which is 
epitomized by France’s two-decade-long Islamic 
headscarf struggles. Conversely, the recognition of 
religion raises the question of whether full equality 
for Islam as a «church» can ever be reached, as 
reflected in Germany’s persistent reticence to grant 
Islam the status of «corporation under public law» 
(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts).11
In the following section, I further explore the existing 
limits of Islam’s integration on both the individual 
and corporate paths. In a third section, I address ten-
sions between (inclusive) law and (restrictive) poli-
tics in the process of Islam’s integration.
2. Limits of Religious Liberty
Overall, in the case of Muslims and Islam, European 
courts have lived up to their function to «protect 
those who can’t protect themselves politically»12 – 
that is, minorities in majoritarian democracies. The 
main source for this protection has been religious 
liberty rights, but also parental education rights, 
which are enshrined in all European state constitu-
tions, including the supranational European Conven-
tion of Human Rights. One critical scholar thus 
found that «the future of the Muslim minority . . . 
depends not so much on how the law might be 
expanded to accommodate its concerns but on a 
larger transformation of the cultural and ethical sen-
sibilities of the majority Judeo-Christian population 
that undergird the law.»13 While the first half of this 
11  Christian Joppke and John Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam:  
A Transatlantic Comparison (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press 2013).. 
12  John Eley, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), 152.
13  Saba Mahmood, «Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An 
Incommensurable Divide,» Critical Inquiry 35 (2009): 860.
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why not prohibit its exact opposite? The «non-mate-
rial» dimension of public order was never «legally 
theorized,» the Council of State warned in a negative 
opinion on the proposed Burqa Law, but here was 
the tunnel that could be dug. «Public order rests on 
a minimal foundation of reciprocity and of essential 
guarantees of life in society,» the Council of State 
declared, anticipating the case that could be made 
against the burqa. «The Republic is lived with the face 
uncovered,» said the justice minister when present-
ing the Burqa Bill to the National Assembly in July 
2010. Or rather: «France is the country where every-
one says ‹bonjour,›» as sociologist and former mem-
ber of the Constitutional Council, Dominique 
Schnapper, put it almost comically. The French Burqa 
Law of 2010, indeed, is an «affirmation of a right and 
an equal belonging of everyone to the social body,» 
as the Council of State critically described, in not 
exactly clear terms, the prospect of such a law. But 
then, this is the land of Durkheim, which always took 
«integration» more serious than most others.
3. Limits of Corporatist Inclusion
Corporatist inclusion is two-pronged. It naturally 
grows out of the collective dimension of religion and is 
thus a «bottom-up» demand by Muslims; but it also 
has become, particularly in Europe, a «top-down» 
process driven by national governments. These are 
rather different faces of the same process, raising dif-
ferent questions. The first raises the question of 
whether Islam, much like any other new religion, can 
ever achieve full equality with the established religions 
that have been integral to the process of European 
state-building and thus inevitably enjoy some privi-
leges and advantages, even though «equality» is still 
the stance a liberal state must take toward all reli-
gions, old and new. The second face is one of national-
izing and domesticating Islam, or of the «institution-
alization of a moderate, Euro-friendly Islam.»18 This is 
often experienced by Muslims as an affront to Islam’s 
inherently transnational ambition of assembling the 
umma, that is, the community of believers, which 
stands above and beyond worldly state borders.
Jonathan Laurence has usefully described the top-
down process in terms of «neo-corporatism,» which 
has a long pedigree as a state instrument for incorpo-
rating transnational movements, while depoliticizing 
the respective conflict and moderating the demands 
that may arise from it: «[J]ust as the state acted to col-
lectively integrate their Jewish and working-class com-
munities, so have recent governments attempted to 
‹transform› the major representatives of Islam in 
18  Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson, «Overhauling Islam,» 
Journal of Church and State (Summer 2007).
drastic liberty restriction imaginable in the contem-
porary liberal state, what to wear in the streets. How 
can it be justified?
Predictably, the French government proclaimed that 
this was no attempt to erase «Islam» from the tex-
ture of French society. To make this liberty restric-
tion compatible with European human rights law, it 
was even necessary to argue, however implausibly, 
that the burqa is not really a religious symbol because 
it is not required by Islamic core doctrine and that it 
is, instead, exclusively a political expression. Never-
theless, the legal-constitutional hurdles to pass such 
a law were dauntingly high. Laicité, which justified 
the 2004 anti-headscarf law, was not a possible 
recourse, because this is a principle to regulate the 
relationship between the state and religion, not pri-
vate people in public places. The emphasis, there-
fore, shifted to «human dignity,» which may be taken 
to be violated by the veil, this «sign of subjugation 
(and) of debasement» (President Sarkozy). This 
approach squared with the focus on women’s equal-
ity that had undergirded the French (and European) 
conflict with Islam all along. 
However, the visibly astounded French lawmakers 
had to learn from constitutional jurists that, as a legal 
principle, «dignity» denotes a subjective reality that 
can be impaired only by a third party – and not by 
persons against themselves. Legally understood, dig-
nity is thus tantamount to human freedom. Factoring 
in the little sociological evidence that exists, which 
suggests that the burqa is usually «chosen» by the 
woman and not imposed on her, the incriminated 
garb becomes, weirdly, an expression rather than 
negation of the woman’s dignity, contrary to what its 
opponents argued. As «dignity» was off the table, 
rescue was sought in a third legal principle, «public 
order,» according to which the burqa might be con-
strued as a security threat. However, from the point 
of view of «security,» a public dress restriction had to 
be tailored to specific times and places and could not 
be general, because this would amount to a level of 
surveillance and restriction of elementary liberties 
that is incommensurate with a liberal society.
After the main legal-constitutional avenues were 
ruled out, a significant amount of political will and 
legal engineering was required to legislate against 
the «integral veil.» As for «political will,» a burqa pro-
hibition was supported by the large majority of the 
French public. The «legal engineering» part was pro-
vided by lawyers who now argued that «public 
order» contained not only a «security» dimension 
but also a dimension of «morality.» Considering that 
nudity had always been outlawed in these terms, 
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reformism today. It looks for the «purposes» behind 
a scriptural obligation that may then be flexibly (that 
is, non-literally) implemented. As Bowen illustrates 
workings of maqasid, «Marrying in city hall is thus 
indicated by scripture, because scripture’s passages 
on marriage have as their purpose to make marriage a 
stable contract.»29 However, social pragmatism thus 
understood implies that Muslims «define the space 
as Islamic, rather than French or European or ‹mod-
ern› or ‹liberal.›»30 If there is «integration,» it is by 
stealth only, happening despite the intentions of the 
Muslim actors involved rather than because of them. 
And it may fail, because Muslims are never forced to 
step outside their religion – or rather, they will follow 
the secular law only to the degree that their religion 
permits. Therefore, Tariq Ramadan stridently says, 
«what Islam will contribute to the West is Islam» and 
a failure to take this into account would «produce 
radical resistance and clashes.»31 On the other side, 
social pragmatism à la Bowen resonates with an ethi-
cally thinned «political» liberalism that stipulates the 
possibility of an «overlapping consensus» on shared 
rules derived from within one’s religion or «compre-
hensive doctrine.»32
Apparently rejected by Muslims and not required by 
political liberalism, «primary loyalty»33 is also legally 
anachronistic. As noted above, Dassetto, Ferrari, and 
Maréchal reasonably argued that subscribing to the 
«values on which the political system and social 
peace are based» is a precondition for the state’s 
«cooperation» with Islam, which is to occur, to repeat 
their felicitous phrase, in an «undiscriminating» way 
but «not indiscriminately.»34  But the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has thrown out such considera-
tion as a precondition for assigning the privileged sta-
tus of «corporation under public law,» which organ-
ized Islam in Germany has sought for many years. By 
contrast, the Christian churches and the organized 
Jewish community have always or long enjoyed this 
status, respectively (among other privileges, this sta-
tus entitles a religious community to tax its members 
with the state’s assistance.) In its landmark decision of 
September 2000 that opened the door for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to be granted the desired public corpora-
tion status, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
held that only formal «fidelity to the law» (Rechtstreue) 
could be expected of the sect, but not any deeper 
29  Ibid., 166.
30  Ibid., 155.
31  Quoted in Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in 
Europe (New York: Penguin, 2009), 244.
32  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
33  Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims (above n. 19), 174.
34  Dassetto, Ferrari and Maréchal, Islam in the European Union (above 
n. 1), 36.
Europe.»19 From this angle, if corporatist inclusion is 
part of a «dual movement» of «expanding religious 
liberty and increasing control exerted over religion,»20 
which is a very accurate description of the relationship 
between Islam and Europe today, it happens to be 
strongly on the «control» side of this process (though 
of course not devoid of «liberty» elements, in terms of 
benefits that accrue from cooperating with the state). 
Laurence even nonchalantly characterizes corporatist 
inclusion as the «reassertion of nation-state 
sovereignty»21 and «prioritization of national laws 
over religious texts.»22  Indeed, part of this process is 
to make corporate Islam accept the constitutional law, 
often by having Muslims sign an official charter that 
lays out this commitment, such as the German 
«Islamic Charta» of 2002.23 Laurence already sees the 
fruits of neo-corporatism’s «transformative powers,»24 
which have been deployed vis-à-vis Muslims only since 
the 1990s: «French Muslim leaders no longer insist 
upon ritual burial without coffins, German Muslim 
leaders have dropped their insistence on religious edu-
cation in Turkish language.»25
While «primary loyalty»26 to nation over religion may 
be the purpose of state-driven corporatist inclusion, 
Muslims do not see it this way. In a compelling ethno-
graphy of the Islamic Milli Görüs community in Ger-
many, Werner Schiffauer stressed that «‹integration› 
into German society» – a public policy obsession in 
Germany and other European states at least since 
2001 – «is not a question for the concerned Muslims 
most of the time . . . Their question rather is . . . ‹How 
can I serve God in the diaspora and fulfill his com-
mands?› or ‹How can I avoid that my children become 
alienated from me?›»27 John Bowen, in an equally 
intriguing analysis of rapprochement between the 
French administrative state and banlieue Islam, char-
acterized the attitude on the ground as «social 
pragmatism.»28 It consists of finding an Islamic justifi-
cation for a secular law, such as marrying in town hall, 
for which there is no religious alternative in France. 
Interestingly, the tools for this rapprochement exist 
within Islamic doctrine in terms of the so-called 
maqasid approach, very much the high road of Islamic 
19  Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 132. 
20  Ibid., 6.
21  Ibid., 25.
22  Ibid., 131. 
23  See Nathal Dessing, «The Islamic Charter as a Tool for Integration,» 
ISIM Newsletter 11 (2002): 36.
24  Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims (above n. 19), 243.
25  Ibid., 199.
26  Ibid., 174.
27  Werner Schiffauer, Nach dem Islamismus: Die Islamische Gemeinschaft 
Milli Görüs (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), 28.
28  Bowen, «A View from France on the Internal Complexity of National 
Models» (above n. 8), 154. 
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lic functions. In stubbornly denying this status to 
Islam, the state can only resort to formal concerns 
about the Islamic organizations’ «durability» – essen-
tially suggesting that they lack the requisite size, level 
of representativeness, and years of existence. But 
these concerns are bound to wither away over time, 
because Muslims are here to stay in German society.
The matter is slightly more complicated when look-
ing at the right to teach Islam as a creedal subject 
(Bekenntnisunterricht) in public schools, under Arti-
cle 7 of the Basic Law. In order to acquire this right, a 
religious community must meet the «durability test» 
that is similar to the one applied in decisions about 
«public corporation» status. While there is consent 
in the German political elite that the Islamic confes-
sion should be taught in public schools (if only to 
bring Islamic education under state control), the 
«loyalty» question cannot be so easily discarded 
here. Public education, after all, is under the «super-
vision of the state,» as § 7 of the Basic Law stipulates. 
As one lawyer argues, the state’s education mandate 
requires that mere «fidelity to the law» (Rechtstreue) 
by a religious group is not sufficient – a «counter-
instruction to the state’s instruction (is) not 
acceptable.»37 This was affirmed in a decision by the 
Hesse Upper Administrative Court that denied the 
Islamic Religious Community of Hesse (IRH) the sta-
tus of Religionsgemeinschaft (religious community) 
that would allow it to teach Islam in the state’s public 
schools. The court ruled that those engaged in public 
education must demonstrate a «special faithfulness 
to the law» (namely, «faithfulness to the constitu-
tion»). In the court’s view, the IRH was beholden to a 
«traditionalist,» Salafi understanding of Islam and 
failed to meet this test.38
Due to a quirk in the German constitution, no «super-
vision of the state» constrains the right to conduct 
religious instruction in Berlin. Promptly, the Islamic 
Federation of Berlin (IFB), a spinoff of the Milli Görüs 
organization, won this right in a local court decision 
in 1998, and it now offers creedal Islamic instruction 
at public expense to about 20 percent of Berlin’s Mus-
lim pupils. When Berlin’s Senate (the state govern-
ment) complained that the IFB’s Islamic instruction 
conflicted with the state’s educational goals of foster-
ing «autonomy» and «equality» in the young genera-
tion, the administrative court countered that, in Ber-
lin at least, religious instruction was entirely a «mat-
ter of the religious communities» that could «not be 
37  Christine Langenfeld, quoted in Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration 
of Islam (above n. 6), chapter 3
38  The Hesse Upper Administrative Court in a September 2005 decision, 
quoted in Joppke and Torpey.
«loyalty» because «this concept [of Rechtstreue] aims 
at an inner disposition, an attitude, and not an exter-
nal behavior.»35  This placed the political state and its 
«integration» interest on a collision course with the 
more anodyne (but Kantian liberal) norms prevailing 
in the legal system.
But the throwing out of the loyalty requirement, which 
had been the state’s routine justification for denying 
Islam its long-standing quest for public corporation 
status, also engendered internal legal inconsistencies. 
Article 4 of the Basic Law, which already guarantees 
religious liberty, includes the collective right of associ-
ation, independent of Article 140 of the Basic Law that, 
in addition, provides public corporation status to reli-
gious communities. If the latter was now famously 
interpreted, in the Constitutional Court’s 2000 Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses decision, as a «means to unfold reli-
gious liberty», the difference between the religious 
liberty (Article 4) and corporate church (Article 140) 
provisions was void. Or rather, this was the moment 
when the old institution-centered «State Law of the 
Churches» (Staatskirchenrecht), which had long regu-
lated the relationship between the state and organized 
religion in Germany, became subordinated to the new 
individual-centered «Constitutional Law of Religion» 
(Religionsverfassungsrecht), in which the individual’s 
religious liberties are held above all institutional con-
siderations in a perfectly symmetric way that knows 
no distinction between «old» and «new» religions. 
Now the paradoxical possibility arose that a religious 
community, not satisfied with merely associating 
according to Article 4 of the Basic Law, «seeks proxim-
ity to the state» by way of invoking public corporation 
status under the church provision (Article 140), while 
at the same time «question(ing) the bases of the 
state’s existence in a principled way.»36 As long as the 
respective religious group did not smash windows or 
throw bombs, there was nothing the state could do 
about this.
After the German Constitutional Court’s Jehovah’s 
Witnesses decision, the door is wide open in principle 
for organized Islam to be recognized as a «corpora-
tion under public law.» In addition to the aforemen-
tioned tax privilege, this status would automatically 
entitle it to teach the Islamic creed at public schools 
at the state’s expense and to participate in the con-
trol of public television and radio, among other pub-
35  Here, and in the following few paragraphs, all quotes and references 
are taken from Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (above 
n. 11), chapter 3.
36  Quoted from the 1997 decision of the German Federal 
Administrative Court, which rejected the Jehovah Witnesses’ request 
for public corporation status in these terms, pointing to a «loyalty» 
deficit vis-à-vis the state. 
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many, there was a true «march through the courts,»43 
which culminated in Islam-friendly judgments by the 
Federal Constitutional Court on ritual slaughtering 
and on the headscarf (worn by teachers, which would 
be unthinkable west of the Rhine River).
In Stage 2, the integration of Islam becomes a politi-
cal topic, and democratically accountable (and thus 
chronically populist) political forces seek to counter-
balance a perceived over-the-top integration by law 
through restrictive legislation. Accordingly, the 
French parliament put an end to the liberal legacy of 
the Council of State through a law prohibiting 
«ostentatious religious symbols» in 2004. This law 
was passed by a center-right government, yet also 
supported by the socialist opposition. However, the 
envisaged restrictions must always meet the high 
hurdles of constitutional law, and therefore politi-
cians consult legal experts or put on their legal hat to 
anticipate and neutralize judicial opposition from 
the start. A textbook example is the parliamentary 
«Burqa Commission» in France, which was almost 
entirely a dialogue between politicians and constitu-
tional lawyers about the limits of what is legally pos-
sible in the liberal-constitutional order, both at 
national and European levels.44 If this commission 
would not recommend a «general and total» burqa 
ban (against the intentions of all of its cross-party 
members and, of course, their principal, the French 
president), this is only because such a ban seemed to 
contradict the French constitution and the Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention (ECHR). If such a 
burqa ban was nevertheless passed, one must inter-
pret this as a rebellion of politics against a perceived 
«dictate» of constitutional law.45
Finally, in Stage 3, politics feeds back on the law, 
changing the latter’s parameters. Judges and courts 
now hesitate to resolve a societal conflict by means 
of law – that is, «undemocratically.» After all, the 
integration of Islam as a religion and of Muslims as a 
minority is primarily a political task that must not be 
blockaded by an autonomous legal system. So one 
can observe that as politics has moved away from a 
de facto multiculturalism to «civic integration» in 
the past decade or so,46 courts have backed away 
from their previous practice of generously granting 
43  Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (above n. 11), 59–66.
44  See Gerin Rapport, «Rapport d’information fait au nom de la mission 
d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire 
national,» Assemblée nationale 2262 (January 26, 2010). 
45  Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (above n. 11 ), 42–46.
46  First noted in Christian Joppke, «Beyond National Models: Civic 
Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe,» West 
European Politics 30/1 (2007): 1–22; and more recently in Sara 
Wallace Goodman, «Fortifying Citizenship,» World Politics 64/4 
(2012): 659–698.
influenced by the state in any way.»39 A respected 
left-liberal newspaper described the atmosphere in 
Berlin schools after the IFB had moved in as follows: 
«Women are reduced in Islamic instruction to the 
role of housewives, and even very small children are 
obliged to fast during Ramadan. Suddenly there is 
anti-Semitism in the schoolyards, even young girls 
wear headscarves, and the number of parents remov-
ing their daughters from biology or sport lessons or 
from class retreats is growing.»40
As these examples show, organized Islam is only an 
inch away from «cooperating» with the state in ful-
filling important public functions, including the 
most precious and delicate of all, which is to educate 
the next generation. German law even forces the 
state to «cooperate» with certain religious organiza-
tions that may be inimical to its liberal and secular 
values. To the degree that the state insists on its 
mandates of «integration» and citizen-formation, 
which the very encounter with Islam has recently 
reinforced, there are obvious limits to corporatist 
inclusion. These limits cannot but move to the fore 
to the degree that it becomes implausible for the 
state to hide behind formalistic recognition criteria 
that obscure the real issues at stake.
4. Tensions between Law and Politics
The integration of Islam is a little noticed example of 
the constitutionalization of politics. Its most impor-
tant chronicler in Europe has aptly described the 
process: «Today judges legislate, parliaments adjudi-
cate, and the boundaries separating law and politics 
– the legislative and judicial functions – are little 
more than academic constructions.»41 
In Legal Integration of Islam (2013), we move beyond 
conventional legal analysis in reconnecting law with 
politics. As we could see already, the integration of 
Islam by law is accompanied by friction with the polit-
ical process. One could summarize the relationship 
between law and politics in terms of a three-stage 
model. In Stage 1, when the topic of Islam is not yet 
politicized, independent courts (especially constitu-
tional courts) mobilize the religious liberty clauses of 
liberal constitutional states, often successfully. Yet in 
doing so, the courts also outpace, and may even con-
tradict public sensibilities. For example, the decisions 
of the French Council of State regarding the head-
scarves of Muslim girls in public schools were strikingly 
liberal and inclusive between 1989 and 2004.42 In Ger-
39  The Berlin Administrative Court, quoted in Joppke and Torpey.
40  Frankfurter Rundschau, quoted in Joppke and Torpey.
41  Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 130.
42  Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity (above n. 16), 37–45.
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5. Conclusion
This reflection on the integration of Islam through 
law, as developed in more detail in Legal Integration 
of Islam (2013), demonstrates the elasticity of liberal 
institutions toward a religion that, perhaps more 
than others, is a source of irritation for liberal socie-
ties. Both aspects – the elasticity of liberal institu-
tions and Islam-specific irritations – are often 
ignored. But integration by law disproves the alleged 
incapability of «Christian» (or rather «secularized») 
Europe to deal fairly with the more vital religions of 
immigrant minorities, especially Islam. On the other 
hand, integration deficits on the demand side tend 
to be ignored, as the slightest intervention in this 
mined terrain is immediately branded as «Oriental-
ism» or «essentialism» or worse.
However, Islam-specific difficulties in adjusting to 
liberal societies are patent. At least one should men-
tion the paradox that the central resource of Islamic 
integration through law – individual rights – is for-
eign to the Islamic tradition. In a passionate analysis 
of the «crisis of Islamic civilization,» the Iraqi intel-
lectual and statesman Ali Allawi conceded that «the 
entire edifice of individual rights . . . is alien to the 
structure of Islamic reasoning.»53 Individual rights 
separate the individual and society, and such a pro-
vincially «Western» separation could not occur in 
the «God-centered community» of Islam. «Rights» in 
Islam, says Allawi, «are in the nature of obligations» 
that stem from God.54 Similarly, the human rights 
scholar Jack Donnelly55 notes that in an Islamic per-
spective, individual rights are not «obligation(s) of 
others» (as in Hohfeld’s analytic jurisprudence56), but 
obligations «of the alleged rights holder(s)» them-
selves. Then it should be no surprise that the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990), issued 
by the Organization of Islamic States (OIS) in 
response to the human rights declaration of the 
United Nations (1948), differs importantly from the 
tenor of the UN declaration. Central to the Cairo 
Declaration is the sharia proviso in its Article 24: «All 
the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declara-
tion are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah.» In Article 1 
of this Islamic declaration on human rights, the word 
«right» does not appear at all. Instead, it begins: «All 
humans beings form one family, whose members are 
united by submission to God and descent from Adam. 
All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and 
53  Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 11.
54  Ibid., 194.
55  Jack Donnelly, «Human Rights and Human Dignity,» American 
Political Science Review 86/2 (1982): 306.
56  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1965 (1919).
religious exemptions from general laws, particularly 
in the sensitive area of public education.
This is evident, for example, in recent more restric-
tive court decisions on requests for religious exemp-
tion from the public school curriculum. I will men-
tion here only one of the latest judgments in a series 
of very similar decisions by German administrative 
courts.47  In June 2012, the Upper Administrative 
Court of Bremen decided that a Muslim girl in ele-
mentary school had to participate in co-educational 
swimming lessons.48 This case shows that an increas-
ingly restrictive court approach coincides with a 
radicalization of Muslim claimants on the ground, 
which was likely encouraged by the previously liberal 
court practice.49 The Bremen case is about a girl who 
is just eight years old, in third grade, which suggests 
that the sexual shame barrier has been lowered far 
into the pre-puberty phase. Moreover, the girl’s par-
ents rejected the school’s compromise offer to have 
her participate with an all-body swimsuit («burqini»), 
claiming that this would entail the «stigmatization» 
of their daughter.50 The court rejected the parental 
claim also by citing an influential benchmark deci-
sion of the Federal Administrative Court from 1993, 
which allowed an abstention from co-educational 
sports instruction only from the beginning of «reli-
gious autonomy» (in that case, the age of 12 or 13). 
More interesting than this formal continuity of juris-
diction is the court’s new emphasis on the «weight» 
of the «state educational mandate» that in previous 
judgments had played no role whatsoever. Now the 
court declared that a seemingly trivial school subject 
like sports instruction is important for «instilling the 
fundamental values of equality and equal treatment 
of men and women,» and it described this sports 
instruction as «principally geared towards socializing 
the children into a respectful and natural relation-
ship between the sexes» and as «work[ing] against 
rigid role patterns.»51 The court thus incorporated 
the «liberal» integration and identity discourse that 
has become dominant in the political system of 
European societies in the wake of the Islam debate. 52 
However, this amounts to a restriction of religious 
liberty rights and of parental education rights.
47  Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (above n. 6), 61–62.
48  Oberverwaltungsgericht (OVG) [Higher Administrative 
Court] Bremen, 1 B 99/12, «Befreiung vom koedukativen 
Schwimmunterricht,» Decision of June 13, 2012.
49  On the latter, see Joppke and Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (above 
n. 6), 59–61.
50  Ibid.
51  Ibid.
52  Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge: Polity, 
2010), chapter 4.
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basic obligations and responsibilities . . .» (Article 1A). 
The central reference to «submission to God,» «obli-
gations,» and «responsibilities» is unusual for a 
«human rights declaration.» In her detailed study on 
Islam and Human Rights, Ann Elizabeth Mayer con-
cludes that in Islamic human rights discourse, «Islam 
is not conceived of as offering the basis for protecting 
rights but solely as the basis for limiting . . . rights.» 57 
However central or peripheral «Islam» may be to the 
57  Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1999), 71.
Islamic understanding of human rights, the integra-
tion of this religion into liberal institutions is still 
remarkable. On the other hand, the possibility of inte-
grating Islam, like any religion, is fully consistent with 
liberal principles. This is because the liberal state’s 
«neutrality» obliges it to refrain from evaluating the 
contents of religion. In this respect, the question of 
the compatibility of theological doctrine and liberal 
principles does not even arise.58  
58  See Olivier Roy, «Secularism and Islam: The Theological 
Predicament,» The International Spectator 48/1): 763–97.
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